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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In  a model  where  banks  play  an  active  role  in monitoring  borrowers,  we  analyze  the  impact  of securitiza-
tion  on  bankers’  incentives  across  different  macroeconomic  scenarios.  We  show  that  securitization  can
be part of  the  optimal  ﬁnancing  scheme  for  banks,  provided  banks  retain  an  equity  tranche  in  the  sold
loans  to  maintain  proper  incentives.  In  economic  downturns  however  securitization  should  be restricted.
The  implementation  of  the  optimal  solvency  scheme  is  achieved  by  setting  appropriate  capital  charges
through  a form  of  capital  insurance,  protecting  the value  of bank  capital  in downturns,  while  providing
additional  liquidity  in  upturns.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the recent years large banks have used massively securiti-
zation (see ECB, 2004; BIS, 2008; Dufﬁe, 2008; Minton et al., 2009,
among others) in order to improve their management of credit risk.
The subprime crisis has shown however that banks using securi-
tization had grossly underestimated their resilience in the event
of a macroeconomic downturn. Banks that had securitized their
loans turned out to be more exposed to credit losses: ﬁrst because
securitization may  have impaired banks’ monitoring incentives and
second, due to excessive leverage,1 they incurred larger losses com-
pared to other banks.
The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of securitization
on bankers’ monitoring incentives across different macroeconomic
scenarios and derive implications for solvency regulation. In par-
ticular we address two questions: (i) Does securitization change
the incentives to monitor? (ii) How should securitization be regu-
lated through the macroeconomic cycle? We  provide the following
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 02 6448 5821; fax: +39 02 6448 5878.
E-mail addresses: vittoria.cerasi@unimib.it (V. Cerasi), rochet@isb.uzh.ch (J.-C.
Rochet).
1 Empirical evidence in Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), Goderis et al. (2006) and
Minton et al. (2009) shows that banks with access to securitization tend to increase
their lending and hold less capital.
answers: (i) incentives are preserved when capital requirements
are computed on the overall size of the loans portfolio – even on
the sold loans that are not on bank’s balance sheet – and provided
the banker retains an equity tranche in the sold loans; (ii) however
securitization should not be permitted in downturns, otherwise
it weakens bankers’ incentives to monitor. Capital requirements
should therefore be set at different levels across the different
macroeconomic scenarios. This optimal solvency scheme is imple-
mented for instance in the form of capital insurance.
Many economists have blamed banking regulators for the
perverse incentives created by the regulatory treatment of secu-
ritization during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, since banks active in
securitization were allowed to hold less capital. Even before the
crisis erupted, some commentators had expressed concerns about
the effect of this massive recourse to securitization on overall risk
taking by banks and on the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a
whole. When transferring credit risk, banks reduce their stake in
the lending activity: this dilution of future claims for banks’ share-
holders introduces perverse incentives to shift losses onto third
parties. As a consequence banks’ effort to monitor loans might be
weakened, as suggested by empirical evidence on securitization
(Keys et al., 2010) similarly to other forms of credit risk sharing
(see Mora, 2010; Ongena et al., 2012). If monitoring is important
for bank credit, then securitization might increase the risk in the
banking sector. Acharya et al. (2012) provide evidence that a favor-
able capital regulatory treatment was  the motive for the increasing
1572-3089/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2012.10.002
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securitization of loans by banks; however given that the risk was
not entirely shifted onto investors nor backed by increased capital
charges, it caused huge losses to the banking sector.
In the paper we develop a simple model of prudential regula-
tion of bank capital, adapted from Holmström and Tirole (1997),
where bankers’ monitoring reduces entrepreneurs’ opportunism.
Bankers are delegated monitors of borrowers on behalf of deposi-
tors. Monitoring incentives are provided through minimum capital
requirements, imposed by uninsured depositors that demand bank
capital as a condition to fund the bank. In this basic setup, we
introduce securitization as an instance of liquidity management
to extend further lending. We  assume that after extending initial
loans, the bank has access to new lending opportunities with posi-
tive net present value (NPV, hereafter). In order to undertake those
new opportunities, the banker can sell old loans through securitiza-
tion. However to preserve monitoring incentives, the banker must
retain an equity tranche in the sold loans. Also capital requirements
must be adjusted accordingly to preserve monitoring incentives by
increasing the capital in proportion to the larger lending size. In
this way, securitization may  be fully accommodated in the optimal
solvency scheme (a similar result is in Plantin, 2010).
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has pointed to the costs of securiti-
zation. Following the macroeconomic upturn in which banks have
committed to greater lending, thanks to securitization, unprece-
dented loans losses have started to materialize in the downturn.
Normally in a recession many downgradings follow a reduction in
the value of loans in the balance sheet of banks. Securitization has
indeed exacerbated the amount of losses for ﬁnancial institutions:
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) provide evidence that 42% of loans
writedowns in ﬁnancial institutions during the recent ﬁnancial cri-
sis are due to securitized loans such as CDOs. Further Gennaioli
et al. (2012) argue that ﬁnancial innovation, and in particular secu-
ritization, is inherently prone to booms and busts linked to the
macroeconomic cycle. To introduce costs from securitization, we
assume that once banks have extended loans, their portfolio might
be hit by an aggregate shock – corresponding to an economic
downturn – that affects negatively loans’ returns. If new lending
opportunities occur after the realization of this shock, securitiza-
tion cannot be optimal in all states of the economy. Indeed NPV of
loans is greater in upturns compared to downturns. Thus in order
to preserve incentives and make the best usage of banks’ capital it is
(second best) efﬁcient to expand lending using securitization only
in upturns and back it with greater capital charges; in downturns
capital must be increased to cover the expected loan losses. There-
fore optimal capital requirements should be state-contingent.
Our simple model of prudential regulation shows that, when
taking into account banker’s incentives in the different states of the
economy, capital requirements should be designed either to insure
for loan losses in downturns or to back the greater lending com-
mitments in upturns. Our conclusions are partially in line with the
capital insurance proposal put forward by Kashyap et al. (2008), and
related to proposals by Flannery (2005, 2009).  To our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst attempt to model the idea of bank capital insur-
ance in a framework where solvency regulation is endogenized by
incentive considerations.
Finally notice that our approach to prudential regulation dif-
fers from the view, shared by prudential authorities, that capital is
a buffer aimed at limiting the probability of a bank’s failure: this
is what we call the Value at Risk approach. In our view instead
banks need capital to provide bankers with appropriate incentives
to monitor borrowers (we call this the incentives approach). These
two views have different implications for the prudential treatment
of securitization. In the Value at Risk approach, securitization, by
transferring credit risk outside the bank, justiﬁes a reduction in
regulatory capital requirements, for a given volume of lending. By
contrast, in the incentives approach, securitization allows to reduce
capital requirements only in so far as bankers’ incentives to monitor
are maintained.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related literature. Section 3 describes the model of
capital regulation; we  start from a simple benchmark model and
then extend this model by introducing new lending opportunities
and a solvency shock. We study the impact of these new features on
the optimal mechanism. In Section 4 we  show that the optimal solu-
tion can be implemented by a combination of securitization (with
adequate capital charges) and capital insurance. Section 5 discusses
the robustness of the results in the previous sections by challeng-
ing some of the modeling assumptions. Concluding remarks are in
Section 6.
2. Related literature
Several papers have analyzed the impact of securitization on
bank’s incentives to monitor borrowers.
In Parlour and Plantin (2008) and Plantin (2010) loan sales pro-
vide liquidity for new investment opportunities, however, since
monitoring is exerted before selling loans, investors cannot dis-
tinguish the true motive of the sale and therefore there could be
scarcity of liquidity in the loan sales market. In contrast we explic-
itly disregard the adverse selection motive and assume symmetric
information at the moment where banks sell their loans, in order
to concentrate on the moral hazard problem between depositors
and the banker. Fender and Mitchell (2009) analyze the effect of
securitization on the banker’s screening effort and discuss various
retention mechanisms of the loans portfolio to preserve incentives;
in our model incentives are maintained through equity tranche
retention within a scheme of optimal capital regulation.
More generally, the beneﬁts provided by various additional
credit risk transfer (CRT, hereafter) instruments in addition to secu-
ritization, are studied in a vast literature that is less directly related
to our paper, for example Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duffee and
Zhou (2001),  Arping (2004),  Morrison (2005), Thompson (2006),
Nicolò and Pelizzon (2008), Chiesa (2008), Pagès (2009),  Parlour
and Winton (forthcoming) and also the references in Kiff et al.
(2003). For instance Parlour and Winton (forthcoming) analyze the
effect of loan sales and credit derivatives on monitoring incentives;
however they focus on the impact on loan quality when banks
have superior information compared to investors and disregard
prudential regulation. Morrison (2005) shows that single-named
credit derivatives impact negatively on monitoring: risk-averse
banks beneﬁt from greater insurance on loan losses, but they
lose incentives to monitor. Nicolò and Pelizzon (2008) analyze
the impact of capital regulation on the incentives to issue dif-
ferent CRT instruments, and show how speciﬁc forms of credit
derivatives could emerge as an optimal signaling device for better
quality banks in response to exogenous capital regulations. Chiesa
(2008) shows that credit derivatives insuring for aggregate risks
improve monitoring incentives, while in our model the optimal
balance of insurance and incentives is achieved through a com-
bination of securitization and capital insurance. However none of
these authors analyze the implications of securitization for capi-
tal regulation. Our objective, rather, is to analyze the implications
of securitization on monitoring incentives together with optimal
capital regulation: therefore we assume that monitoring is exerted
after securitizing loans, while disregarding the implications of pri-
vate information in ﬁnancial markets.
Another strand of the literature analyzes how the allocation of
risks across sectors in the economy changes following the partici-
pation of banks in CRT markets. For instance Wagner and Marsh
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(2006) show that transfer of risk from banks to other sectors
enhances welfare, when the banking sector is less diversiﬁed com-
pared to other non-banking sectors, as the greater diversiﬁcation
compensates the reduction in monitoring and is beneﬁcial for
ﬁnancial stability. Allen and Carletti (2006) show that under some
conditions on the distribution of liquidity shocks across banks,
transfers of risks from the banking sector to the insurance sector do
increase ﬁnancial stability. In this paper instead we focus on moni-
toring incentives at a representative bank level and do not consider
the impact on the allocation of risks across banks or across sectors.
Wagner (2007) analyses the implications of CRT for bank solvency.
He shows that it improves loans liquidity by diminishing the like-
lihood of bank runs. However when taking into account ex-ante
incentives, this greater liquidity induces greater risk-taking by the
bank and thus the positive effect on bank stability is reversed.
Our paper is related to the idea of state-contingent capital reg-
ulation such as in Kashyap and Stein (2004), Flannery (2005) and
more recently Kashyap et al. (2008).  Kashyap and Stein (2004) have
put forward the idea that capital regulation should serve both to
insure loan losses and to reduce under-investment problems in the
different states of the economy. As far as we know, our model pro-
vides the ﬁrst attempt to examine this idea in a formalized model.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature initiated by
Froot et al. (1993),  showing how appropriate risk management
policies can be used in order to align better the investment capacity
of a ﬁrm to its investment opportunities. We  show that when reg-
ulating banks, appropriate risk management policies can be used
in order to increase their investment capacity (i.e. reduce their
solvency ratio).
3. A model of capital regulation
The aim of our model is to analyze in a tractable way  the impact
of securitization on the monitoring activity of banks across dif-
ferent macroeconomic scenarios and to derive implications for
prudential regulation. We  start by introducing a simple benchmark
model where minimum capital requirements are the solution to the
moral hazard problem between depositors and bankers. In a con-
text where banks, whose main function is to monitor borrowers,
have an incentive to exploit their informational advantage and shift
portfolio losses onto depositors, minimum capital requirements
provide bankers with correct incentives to monitor.
We then add to this simple benchmark model two  new ingre-
dients in order to introduce securitization and analyze its impact
across different macroeconomic scenarios: an interim shock on
loan returns driven by macroeconomic conditions and the possi-
bility to undertake new lending opportunities at a latter stage. On
the one hand to be able to supply lending to these new invest-
ment opportunities the bank might securitize loans. On the other
hand if expected returns from loans are reduced by a macro shock,
additional capital is necessary to cover expected losses instead of
funding the new lending opportunities. We  show that securitiza-
tion together with an insurance scheme, providing capital only in
the state where lending is most valuable, allows an efﬁcient use of
bank capital.
3.1. A simple benchmark model
Our starting point is a simple benchmark model adapted from
Holmström and Tirole (1997) to banks, as in Rochet (2004).
Consider a two-date economy (t = 0, 1). At date 0 a bank, with
(ﬁxed) capital E0, raises an endogenous volume of uninsured
deposits D0 from dispersed investors and extends loans L0 to some
entrepreneurs. Investors’ alternative return per unit invested is
a riskless rate 1. All agents are risk-neutral and care only about
expected revenues.
Entrepreneurs rely on banking ﬁnance to undertake a risky
project: each project requires 1 unit of investment at date 0 and
normally yields R > 1 at date 1. The banker holds a portfolio of loans
whose risk of default is not entirely diversiﬁable.2 Credit risk is
modeled by introducing a probability that the bank’s loans portfolio
suffers a loss  ∈ [0, R] per unit lent. The bank’s loans portfolio is thus
characterized by a probability of default p + p  ∈ [0, 1] and a loss
given default . The probability of suffering losses can be reduced
by p  when the banker monitors loans; non-monitoring renders a
private beneﬁt B > 0 per unit lent to the banker. We  assume constant
returns to scale both for loan returns and private beneﬁts.
Further, we assume that there is scope for efﬁcient monitored
ﬁnance3
[R − p]  > 1 > [R − (p + p)] + B, (A1)
which requires  > (B/p). The disequality on the left hand side
says that the NPV of monitored loans is greater than the alterna-
tive return for investors: hence monitored ﬁnance is proﬁtable. The
disequality on the right hand side says that when a loan is not mon-
itored it returns less than the alternative investment: investors are
willing to fund bankers provided they monitor loans. Given that
the monitoring effort is non-observable by outsiders, the banker is
subject to moral-hazard. For the banker to monitor the portfolio
of loans the following incentive compatibility condition must be
fulﬁlled
(1 − p)(RL0 − D1) ≥ (1 − p − p)(RL0 − D1) + BL0,
where D1 is the repayment promised to uninsured depositors at
date 1 in exchange for their deposits D0 at date 0.4 This is equivalent
to the constraint
b ≡ RL0 − D1 ≥
B
p
L0, (1)
where b represents the banker’s reward when the bank is sol-
vent; when instead the repayment to depositors is greater than the
return of the loans portfolio, D1 > (R − )L0, the bank defaults, repays
(R − )L0 to depositors and nothing to the banker.5 The incentive
compatibility condition can also be rewritten as
D1 ≤
(
R − B
p
)
L0. (2)
2 Loan losses here are not diversiﬁable and as a consequence the bank holds some
non-diversiﬁable risk in its portfolio. There is a literature on the beneﬁts of loans
portfolio diversiﬁcation for banker’s incentives to monitor (see Diamond, 1984;
Cerasi and Daltung, 2000, where the result of Diamond is applied to a context sim-
ilar  to the one in this paper). In our case inside equity is a perfect substitute for
diversiﬁcation as it fully restores incentives, as shown by Holmström and Tirole
(1997).
3 Given that investors are dispersed, they do not have incentives to monitor.
Monitored ﬁnance can be better provided by bankers.
4 Here deposits are not insured. This implies that D1 > D0 because depositors
demand a risk premium for bearing the risk of a default of the loans portfolio. In case
depositors were unwilling to suffer any change in the face value of their deposits,
namely D1 = D0, then we would have also a rational for deposit insurance. Given that
depositors are risk-neutral this assumption does not affect our results as we explain
at  the end of this section.
5 The banker’s reward diminishes with loan losses and increases with the size of
the  portfolio of loans. It is possible to show that this reward implies rewarding the
banker only if loan losses are below ∗ , setting b() =  ∗L0 when  ≤  ∗ = B/p, and
0  otherwise. In the model we assume that the distribution of losses ˜ is Bernoullian,
namely ˜ =  with probability p and ˜ = 0 with probability (1 − p). In Appendix B we
generalize the problem to the case of a continuous loan losses probability function
F (˜).
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Given that depositors do not observe the monitoring effort and that
the banker derives a private beneﬁt from not monitoring, she can-
not credibly promise to repay depositors an amount greater than
the maximum pledgeable income deﬁned by the right-hand side in
(2).
Date 0 bank’s balance sheet is deﬁned as
L0 = E0 + D0. (3)
The participation condition for depositors, when the banker mon-
itors, is
(1 − p)D1 + p(R − )L0 ≥ D0, (4)
and after substituting (3),  it becomes
E0 ≥ [1 − p(R − )]L0 − (1 − p)D1. (5)
In this simple model the capital adequacy requirement is the
solution to the moral hazard problem between the banker and
depositors. We  make the following assumption:
R − p − (1 − p) B
p
< 1. (A2)
Proposition 1. The (second-best) solution implies a capital ade-
quacy requirement limiting banks’ lending to a certain multiple of their
equity, that is
L0 ≤
E0
kS
where kS ≡ 1 − R + (B/p) + p( − (B/p)), which is positive by (A2),
can be interpreted as a (simple) capital ratio.
Proof. The banker’s problem requires choosing the level of loans
L0 and deposits D0 that maximize expected social surplus
S = [R − p − 1]L0
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (2) and depositors’
participation condition (4).  Given (A1) the expected social surplus
is increasing in the amount of lending L0. The optimal solution is
obtained by substituting the binding incentive constraint (2) into
(5). We  thus obtain the maximum volume of lending
E0 =
[
1 − R + B
p
+ p
(
 − B
p
)]
L0. 
Assumption (A2) means that the maximum expected return that
depositors can obtain while preserving bankers’ incentives (the left
hand side of (A2)) is less than 1. This implies that banks need capital,
i.e. that kS = 1 − R + B/p + p( − (B/p)) > 0. In other words, there is
need of a minimum level of “informed” capital kS to cover expected
loan losses and to repay the banker for her effort. From Proposition
1 it follows that banks can expand their lending up to a maximum
of 1/kS of their equity. A greater capital ratio implies tighter credit
conditions.
Note that our simple model delivers implications for the design
of capital requirements.6 Our capital ratio decreases with the
return R on loans and increases with the intensity of moral haz-
ard, measured by the ratio B/p. In addition, it increases with
expected shortfalls since the last term p( − (B/p)) coincides with
depositors’ expected shortfall p[D1/L0 − (R − )] when the incen-
tive constraint (2) is binding. Thus our incentives-based capital
ratio behaves more like an expected shortfall (or Tail VaR) mea-
sure rather than a VaR (Value-at-Risk), although like a VaR indicator
6 In Appendix B we  show that the main ﬂavor of this result remains when intro-
ducing a more realistic model of default risk.
our capital ratio increases with expected loan losses  and default
probability p.
To summarize, the solution in Proposition 1 requires the banker
to self-ﬁnance a sufﬁciently large fraction of her loans as a con-
dition for depositors to fund themselves the banker, very much
in the way  that private ﬁnanciers require corporations to ﬁnance
with own  capital a sufﬁcient fraction of their investment projects.
This self-regulation solution can be interpreted also as the optimal
prudential regulation scheme when we  assume that the regulator,
acting in the interest of depositors, does not observe the banker’s
effort (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999 for a detailed discussion
of this representation approach to banks’ prudential regulation):
in that case the optimal prudential scheme would require a fairly
priced deposit insurance in addition to the minimum capital ratio
kS.
3.2. The model with macroeconomic uncertainty
We now add two ingredients to the simple benchmark model:
new lending opportunities and a macroeconomic shock to the value
of the loans portfolio. These two ingredients enable us to intro-
duce securitization and analyze its impact on monitoring incentives
across different macroeconomic scenarios in a simple theoretical
framework.
New lending opportunities arise at an intermediate date
between 0 and 1. More speciﬁcally, we assume that at date 1/2 the
banker has the possibility to extend new loans of the same qual-
ity as the old ones, leading to a total volume of L = (1 + x)L0 with
x ∈ [0, ˇ]. This means that there is the possibility that new valu-
able ﬁnancing opportunities become available once the banker has
already extended L0 loans in the ﬁrst stage.7 To be able to expand
loans by xL0 at date 1/2, the banker can resort to new investors in
ﬁnancial markets.
Further, we model the state of the macroeconomy by adding an
exogenous solvency shock that affects the expected return on the
loans portfolio in the worse scenario. More speciﬁcally, we  assume
that between dates 0 and 1/2 (after the banker has extended initial
loans L0 but before the new opportunities arise) a publicly observ-
able shock occurs (say, a recession) with probability q ∈ [0, 1] : in
this event the loans portfolio only returns (R − ˛), instead of R .The
parameter ˛ ∈ (0, R) can be interpreted as the actual loss that mate-
rializes at the later date 1 when there is a recession. Note that
new lending opportunities arise at the same rate  ˇ regardless of
the state of the economy. Hence the difference between the two
macroeconomic states is that in recession loan losses are larger. To
summarize, there are two  kinds of credit losses:
• Exogenous credit losses  ˛ associated with the aggregate state
of the economy: either an upturn where the value of loans is
preserved (no credit loss) or a downturn where credit losses are ˛
per unit lent. The loss  ˛ is exogenous, since it is independent upon
the effort of the banker. The state of the economy is observable
and veriﬁable, so that contracts can be written contingent on this
state.
• An endogenous credit loss  whose probability can be reduced
from p + p  to p when the banker exerts monitoring effort.
Although the credit loss  is observable, the banker’s monitoring
effort is not.
7 The assumption that the new loans are a percentage of old loans is not crucial,
but  simpliﬁes the algebra. In addition, we assume that their return is equal to the
old  loans to eliminate results driven by arbitrage across different type of loans. In
contrast to stage ﬁnancing however, the new loans cannot depend upon the past
performance of the old loans as the old ones have not reached their maturity yet.
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Fig. 1. The expected returns of the portfolio of loans and the timing. The ﬁgure shows the returns of the loans portfolio in each of the different states together with the
timing of the model. At date 0 the bank with capital E0 lends L0. Between dates 0 and 1/2 an exogenous macro shock occurs: if with probability (1 −q) the state of the world
is  “u” (upturn) the portfolio returns R per loan, otherwise with probability q state “d” (downturn) occurs and the unitary return is (R − ˛). After the realization of the macro
shock, new ﬁnancing opportunities arise and the banker might decide at date 1/2 to extend lending up to ˇL0 in both states of the world, so that total loan size might be Lu
in state u or Ld in state d. Afterwards, the banker exerts monitoring effort to reduce the probability of loan losses .
After the realization of the shock and after new loans have pos-
sibly been funded, the banker decides whether or not she monitors
the overall portfolio of loans.8 If she does, she reduces the proba-
bility of endogenous credit losses  by p.  We  assume that even in
downturns, monitored loans remains proﬁtable:
R − p −  ˛ > 1. (A3)
Fig. 1 might help clarify the sequence of events and total revenues.
The upper branch variables are denoted by a superscript u (upturn),
while the lower branch variables are denoted by a superscript d
(downturn).
For the banker to monitor the portfolio of loans, an incentive
compatibility constraint similar to (1) must hold in each state:
bu ≥ B
p
Lu, bd ≥ B
p
Ld, (6)
where bs denotes the banker’s bonus9 in state s, while Ls denotes
the size of the loans portfolio in state s (with s = u, d). The banker’s
payoff is equal to the difference between loans’ revenues and the
sum of repayments of the banker to depositors and investors, as it
will become clear in what follows.
From an ex-ante perspective, depositors are willing to fund the
bank at date 0 if the face value of deposits D1 at date 1 or what is
left in case the loans portfolio defaults, is at least equal to D0, that
is whenever their participation constraint holds
(1 − q)[(1 − p)D1 + p(R − )Lu] + q[(1 − p)D1 + p(R −  ˛ − )Ld] ≥ D0
(7)
8 This timing simpliﬁes the model as it avoids being concerned about the lemon
problem on the quality of the loans in the bank portfolio. The bank acquires infor-
mation on loans, through monitoring, after raising funds from ﬁnancial markets.
Therefore the bank is as informed as investors about the quality of loans in her
portfolio. Plantin (2010) discusses the effect of anticipating the timing at which
monitoring occurs in a model similar to this. He analyses the costs of securitization
when the banker monitors before selling loans: the lack of commitment in the sale
of  loans may  cause a liquidity problem in those markets.
9 Throughout the paper we neglect possible agency problems between the man-
agers and the shareholders of the bank: what we  call the “banker” represents the
coalition of the two. If there is a possible conﬂict of interest between managers
and shareholders, control of managers’ remunerations by regulators might be a
necessary complement to capital requirements.
Similarly, new investors are willing to inject new funds at date 1/2 if
and only if their expected revenue matches at least the opportunity
cost of the capital they have invested in the bank:
(1 − q)(1 − p)[RLu − bu − D1] + q(1 − p)[(R − ˛)Ld − bd − D1]
≥ [(1 − q)xu + qxd]L0. (8)
The left hand side of this condition, the participation constraint of
investors, is the expected return of the loans portfolio when suc-
cessful, after repaying depositors and the banker. The right hand
side is the expected opportunity cost of their funds. These new
investors must be endowed with a greater risk appetite compared
to depositors funding the bank at date 0.10
The optimal solution is now characterized by the vector (L0, xu,
xd) that maximizes expected social surplus
S = (1 − q)[R − p − 1]Lu + q[R −  ˛ − p − 1]Ld (9)
under constraints (6)–(8) and the feasibility conditions xu, xd ∈ [0,
ˇ]. The control variables are the volume of lending L0 at date 0 and
the liquidity injections by new investors at date 1/2, respectively
xuL0 = Lu − L0 and xdL0 = Ld − L0.
Proposition 2. The (second best) solution is characterized by an
initial volume of lending limited to
L0 ≤
E0
k0
where k0 ≡ (1 − q)(1 + ˇ)kS + q(kS + ˛) denotes the modiﬁed capital
ratio at date 0. Moreover xu = ˇ, xd = 0: at date 1/2 the banker is allowed
to expand lending only in upturns but not in downturns.
Proof. See in Appendix A. 
The optimal solution implies setting different expansion rates
for lending across states, namely xu =  ˇ and xd = 0. In other words
the banker is allowed to lend at full capacity only in upturns, not in
downturns. Note that the rate at which new lending opportunities
arise is identical across states, therefore the different expansion
10 These new investors bear the macroeconomic risk. This point is further dis-
cussed in Section 5.
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rates do not depend by different opportunities across states, but
to the fact that monitoring is more valuable in upturns (where
its marginal beneﬁt is greatest).11 To foster monitoring incentives,
the solution requires stretching the difference in banker’s earnings
between state u and state d, given by (bu − bd) = (B/p)(xu − xd)L0.
An increase in L0 alone would not reward the effort in state u more
than in state d. To reach a difference in rewards for the marginal
effort, the difference in lending rates (xu − xd) must be set apart as
far as possible.
The modiﬁed capital ratio reﬂects this property and it allows
implementing the (second best) optimal volume of lending in each
state. In upturns the banker is allowed to expand by  ˇ its initial
lending: if we apply the simple capital ratio kS to this larger lend-
ing base we obtain a capital requirement Eu = kSLu = kS(1 + ˇ)L0 and
a contingent capital ratio ku = (1 + ˇ)kS. In downturns the lending
base remains L0 but the expected return on loans is smaller due to
the exogenous loan losses: the capital requirement must become
Ed = (kS + ˛)L0 associated with a contingent capital ratio kd = kS + ˛.
The ex-ante capital ratio k0 (at date 0) is the weighted average of
these two different capital ratios, which are set at different values
conditional on the macroeconomic state:
k0 = (1 − q)ku + qkd.
To conclude, the capital ratio must be tighter in each of the two
macroeconomic states but for a different reason: in state u more
capital is needed in order to expand lending, while in state d more
capital is needed to cover the exogenous credit losses on the loans
portfolio.
4. Securitization with capital insurance
In this section we show how the optimal solution derived in
Proposition 2 can be implemented through a combination of secu-
ritization and capital insurance.
Securitization.  To be able to supply new business opportuni-
ties in upturns the banker raises new funds ˇL0 from investors at
date 1/2. One way to achieve this is to sell a fraction y of initial
loans to investors in ﬁnancial markets. The optimal fraction of the
portfolio of loans that needs to be sold to preserve the banker’s
incentive to monitor, can be derived as follows. The banker must
be rewarded B/p per loan in case the bank is solvent, while 0 in
the event of default: this is equivalent to say that the banker must
retain an equity tranche in the sold loan to preserve her incentive
to monitor the loan.12 On each of the sold loans, thus investors
earn (R − (B/p)) if the loan succeeds, and (R − ) in case the loan
defaults. The price the new investors funding the bank at date 1/2
are willing to pay for each sold loan must be equal to its expected
revenue
P = (1 − p)
(
R − B
p
)
+ p(R − ) = 1 − kS (10)
that is, investors gain from the return on the loan once the bonus
to the banker has been paid. This price is the maximum price that
new investors are ready to pay for the non-equity tranche of the
11 If we had different values of ˇ, with ˇu > ˇd , the solution would be to expand
lending up to ˇu since the NPV of loans is greater in upturns given the loan losses ˛
in  downtuns.
12 The result of optimality of equity tranche retention for incentives is not new:
Fender and Mitchell (2009) for instance show that it is one of the possible solutions
to  revitalize securitization markets in the wake of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. We
show that the solution of equity tranche retention must be backed by tighter capital
requirements, due to the greater risk of default for the banker as suggested by the
empirical evidence in Acharya et al. (2012).
loans portfolio. Note that, due to assumption (A2), it follows that
P < 1.
To be able to extend new loans, the banker has to sell a propor-
tion of old loans y such that yP = ˇ, that is
y = ˇ
1 − kS
> ˇ.
Since the banker has to retain a stake in initial loans (in order to
maintain her monitoring incentives), this leads to a number of sold
loans that exceeds the number of new loans: y > ˇ.
The optimal solution described in Proposition 2 requires in
addition a system of capital insurance. Given that total lending
is constrained by the maximum pledgeable income to depositors
which differs across states, the banker can smooth this difference
and doing so she boosts lending and saves bank capital. This is why
some form of state-contingent transfers across states is needed. As
we will explain, this can be interpreted as capital insurance.
Capital insurance.  To implement the optimal solution, state-
contingent transfers are needed in addition to securitization. The
banker can in fact sign with new investors an insurance contract
at date 0 to commit to transfer money across the two states once
the uncertainty is resolved. This can be interpreted as a state-
contingent contract where the banker commits to pay those new
investors Tu in state u and Td in state d once date 1 is reached.13 For
this contract to be fairly priced, the contingent transfers Tu and Td
must fulﬁll the condition
qTd + (1 − q)Tu = 0.
We can state the following result.
Proposition 3. The optimal solution can be implemented by the
following series of capital ratios:
k0 = (1 − q)(1 + ˇ)kS + q(kS + ˛) (11)
at date 0, and two state-contingent capital ratios at date 1: kS in state
u and kS +  ˛ in state d. Given that the banker increases the volume of
loans by a fraction  ˇ in state u, regulatory capital must equal (at least)
kS(1 + ˇ)L0 in state u and (kS + ˛)L0 in state d. Regulatory capital at date
0 equals the expected value of regulatory capital in the two states.14
New loans are ﬁnanced through securitization only in state u by selling
a fraction
y = ˇ
1 − kS
of initial loans. In state d, the banker is not allowed to issue new loans.
Finally adjustments in regulatory capital are provided by contingent
transfers paid by the bank to investors:
Tu = qWL0; Td = −(1 − q)WL0
with W ≡
[
 ˛ − y(R − Bp )kS
]
.
Proof. See in Appendix A. 
To get the intuition for the result in the proposition, let us ﬁrst
consider the case with  ˛ = 0 and  ˇ > 0, that is without macro shocks
but with new lending opportunities at date 1/2. In this case the
13 The same result can be obtained with an insurance contract where the banker
pays a fair premium at date 0, in order to have a state contingent refund at date 1.
In  both interpretations when the bank is insolvent the refund is cashed directly by
depositors, otherwise by bank’s shareholders.
14 In our simple model, the capital ratio is always binding for the bank (both at date
0  and in each of the two states as explained at the end of the current section). In a
more complex model, we could obtain a difference between economic capital and
regulatory capital. This would require introducing more periods and possibilities
for the bank to issue more capital or distribute dividends.
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only possible state of the economy is state u: since the expected
surplus is increasing in the total amount of lending, all new busi-
ness opportunities must be ﬁnanced, i.e. Lu = (1 + ˇ)L0. The banker
sells a proportion y of old loans to new investors at date 1/2 at
price P deﬁned in (10) to expand lending by ˇL0. For the banker to
monitor the portfolio of loans the following incentive compatibility
condition must hold
D1 ≤ RLu − bu − y
(
R − B
p
)
L0,
where bu = (B/p)Lu is the bonus to the banker and the last term
is the return to the investors who have bought a fraction y of old
loans in case the bank is solvent. Hence the maximum return that
the banker can promise to her depositors is
D1 ≤ (1 +  ˇ − y)
(
R − B
p
)
L0, (12)
where (1 +  ˇ − y) is the share of loans still in the balance sheet of
the bank at date 1. The depositors’ participation condition is
D1(1 − p) + p(R − )(1 +  ˇ − y)L0 ≥ D0 (13)
where the face value D1 is paid in case the loans portfolio succeeds
or whatever is left in case the bank is insolvent. The optimal solution
is given by the maximum amount of lending fulﬁlling (12) and (13).
Substituting date 0 balance sheet from (3),  we derive the optimal
capital ratio k0 = (1 + ˇ)kS. To commit to this lending the banker has
to hold (1 + ˇ)kS informed capital: kS is needed to convince deposi-
tors to fund the bank at date 0, while an additional ˇkS to convince
new investors to provide the liquidity so to expand loans by ˇL0 at
date 1/2.
Let us now consider the opposite case with macro shocks, but
without new lending opportunities at date 1/2, that is  ˛ > 0 and
 ˇ = 0. In this case the banker does not need liquidity at the interim
date (y = 0), but buys insurance to cover the exogenous credit losses.
The capital ratio at date 0 is augmented relatively to the simple
benchmark model by q˛, representing the capital insurance pre-
mium paid to cover the losses when the solvency shock occurs in
state d. To understand the intuition of this result, we compute the
maximum return for depositors in the absence of the capital insur-
ance. This amount takes different values in the two  macroeconomic
states. The maximum pledgeable income to depositors in state u is
(
R − B
p
)
L0,
while in state d it is diminished by the loan losses, that is(
R − B
p
)
L0 − ˛L0.
Without capital insurance, the face value of deposits is given by
the minimum of these two terms, that is by state d maximum
pledgeable income. Exogenous loan losses reduce the face value
of deposits in state d, while in state u the banker is left with an
extra-rent
bu = B
p
L0 + ˛L0.
There is scope for smoothing income across states: by paying an
insurance premium q˛L0 to cover the losses ˛L0 in state d, the
maximum pledgeable income in state d would be reduced just by
the amount of the capital insurance premium instead the entire
exogenous loan losses, i.e.
D1 =
(
R − B
p
)
L0 − q˛L0.
There is also a beneﬁt in terms of saved capital; with capital insur-
ance the capital ratio at date 0 is k0 = kS + q  ˛ which is smaller than
the capital ratio without insurance kS + ˛(1 − p) + qp˛  as it can be
easily proved. State-contingent insurance boosts total lending and
for this reason it dominates the solution without capital insurance.
The version of our model with  ˛ > 0 (exogenous credit losses due
to adverse macroeconomic conditions) and  ˇ = 0 (no new lending
opportunities at date 1/2) is thus a way  to formalize the capital
insurance ideas of Flannery (2005) and Kashyap et al. (2008).15
When  ˛ and  ˇ are both positive, things are more compli-
cated, although a combination of the two  previous cases. To foster
banker’s incentives it is optimal to use capital in order to extend
lending in state u. However in state d the banker needs capital to
cover loan losses. There is a tension between these two  different
uses of capital. We  compute the maximum pledgeable income to
depositors in state u
RLu − bu − y
(
R − B
p
)
L0 =
(
R − B
p
)
L0 − y
(
R − B
p
)
kSL0
and in state d(
R − B
p
)
L0 − ˛L0.
The face value D1 is given by the minimum of the two values, that
is
D1 =
(
R − B
p
)
L0 − max
{
˛, y
(
R − B
p
)
kS
}
L0.
When W =  ˛ − y(R − (B/p))kS > 0, the face value of deposits is
determined by state d maximum pledgeable income, leaving an
extra-rent W to the banker in state u. Using an argument similar to
the one discussed before, the optimal solution requires to transfer
capital from state u to state d to smooth depositors’s income across
the two states. The banker might buy protection to insure for the
exogenous loan losses linked to the macroeconomic downturn; for
each unit of premium qW > 0 the banker receives a refund of W > 0
in state d. When W =  ˛ − y(R − (B/p))kS < 0 instead, deposits’ face
value is bound by state u maximum pledgeable income, leaving an
extra-rent to the banker of (− W)  > 0 in state d. Again, to boost lend-
ing capacity in state u the solution requires to smooth income to
depositors across the two  states by redistributing capital from state
d to state u. The banker might sell protection, namely she receives
a premium qW in both states and pays W < 0 when state d occurs.
To conclude, there is a tension between incentives and insurance,
that is resolved in opposite ways according to the sign of W.  When
the macro shock dominates (W > 0) insuring loan losses helps to
restore incentives, while it destroys incentives when new lending
opportunities dominate (W < 0).
In both cases, capital requirements are tighter compared to the
simple benchmark case, since k0 > kS. Loan losses and greater com-
mitment to lend, although for different reasons, require holding
more capital: on the one hand, in state d the additional capital
is equivalent to the amount of the premium to insure depositors
against expected loan losses; on the other hand, in state u addi-
tional capital is required to back the greater lending commitment
arising from funding the new business opportunities.
To understand the details of the implementation of the opti-
mal  capital ratio, we compute the two  (interim) state-contingent
capital ratios, namely the capital ratios after the realization of the
15 Chiesa (2008) considers a model, similar to our case with  ˛ > 0 and  ˇ = 0,
although in her model monitoring is more valuable in state d. She shows that
the optimal contract is implemented through credit derivatives on the aggregate
portfolio of loans.
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macroeconomic shock at date 1/2. In state u, the bank sells a fraction
y of its initial loans, in order to ﬁnance a fraction  ˇ of new loans.16
As already noted, the banker’s incentive to monitor the sold loans
is maintained if she retains the equity tranche of these new loans
and capital charges are raised by an additional E1 = ykSL0. Moreover
the (unconsolidated) balance sheet of the bank at date 1/2 in state
u is
L0(1 +  ˇ − y) = Eu + (1 − p)Tu + [(1 − p)Du + p(R − )(1 +  ˇ − y)L0],
which gives after simpliﬁcation:
Eu = kSL0(1 +  ˇ − y).
Overall the bank maintains total capital Eu + E1 = kS(1 + ˇ)L0, equiva-
lent to a capital ratio ku = kS(1 + ˇ) in state u. This implies computing
the capital ratio kS on a larger lending base, i.e. Lu = (1 + ˇ)L0. Thus
there is no change compared to the simple benchmark capital
ratio, provided that the solvency ratio is satisﬁed at the consoli-
dated level.17 In particular our analysis suggests that the regulator
must require bankers to maintain an equity tranche in the securi-
tized assets and must set appropriate capital charges. Not having
set those appropriate capital charges has been one of the reg-
ulatory faults at the hearth of the huge losses in the banking
sector during the subprime crisis as documented by Acharya et al.
(2012).18
The other state contingent capital ratio in state d, must be aug-
mented, anticipating the deterioration of proﬁtability. Indeed, the
balance sheet of the bank at date 1/2 in state d is:
L0 = Ed + (1 − p)Td + [(1 − p)D1 + p(R −  ˛ − )L0],
which gives after simpliﬁcation Ed = (kS + ˛)L0 implying a capital
ratio kd = (kS + ˛). This tighter capital ratio also prevents the bank
from increasing its lending in state d, which would destroy the
banker’s incentive to monitor her loans.
Finally, the difference between the two state-contingent capital
ratios
kd − ku =  ˛ − ˇkS
captures the relative strength of the two motives for holding more
capital in the different macroeconomic conditions. This has impli-
cations for the behavior of the optimal capital ratio during the
cycle. When  ˛ − ˇkS > 0 the capital ratio in state d is greater than in
state u and lending is pro-cyclical (since the optimal capital ratio is
tighter in downturns than in upturns), while the opposite holds for
 ˛ − ˇkS < 0. In the solution the pro-cyclicality in lending implied by
the optimal capital ratio is not necessarily a problem when the sol-
vency shock is severe. However when under-investment in upturns
is the main concern, the optimal solution implies anti-cyclical lend-
ing (since the capital ratio would be larger in upturns to sustain
the larger lending commitment). Our solution is in line with the
idea in Kashyap and Stein (2004) that capital regulation should
resolve the tension between two contrasting objectives, insuring
16 Notice that the money raised by selling old loans PyL0 is completely absorbed
by the new loans ˇL0, leaving the banker without any idle liquidity, since yP = ˇ.
17 What we  have in mind here is partial securitization where a portfolio of loans
is  sliced into several tranches and transferred as Asset Backed Security (ABS) to a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Our solution implies that the regulator obliges the
bank to keep the junior tranche of the ABS it creates. Furthermore the capital charge
of  the bank is computed on the consolidated balance sheet of the bank plus the SPV.
18 Many commentators of the subprime crisis have pointed out multiple regulatory
failures (see for instance Hellwig, 2009). We  suggest that the Basel Committee and
other regulatory bodies did not fully anticipate the implications of the securitization
process for the bankers’ incentives to monitor their borrowers. This paper provides
policy recommendations on how to correct this regulatory failure.
for loan losses in downturns, while also reducing under-investment
in upturns.
5. Discussion
Our results show that a combination of capital insurance and
securitization (with appropriate capital charges) is a way  to man-
age optimally the bank’s interim liquidity needs. Our results may
arise as a consequence of several assumptions in the model. Let
us discuss the implications of some of these assumptions for the
solution we  propose in the paper.
First of all, not only investors but other banks could in principle
supply liquidity at date 1/2 after the solvency shock has occurred,
although they are likely to be hit by the same shock, which rep-
resents a global economic downturn (recession). As the subprime
crisis has shown, a generalized freeze in interbank and money mar-
kets is not a purely theoretical possibility. Contingent instruments
by contrast provide ﬂexibility for funding at the time when new
investment opportunities arise and in the contingencies in which
it is desirable.19 What happens instead if neither investors in ﬁnan-
cial markets nor other banks can provide the liquidity at date 1/2?
If the access to ﬁnancial markets is precluded at date 1/2 then one
solution for the bank is to hoard liquidity at date 0 in order to be
able to undertake the new business opportunities at a later date. Let
us consider the consequences of such a restriction by comparing it
to the second best solution in Proposition 2.
Liquidity hoarding. Holding liquidity in excess before the real-
ization of the solvency shock could be a solution to avoid turning
down future lending opportunities in case access to ﬁnancial mar-
kets at date 1/2 is restricted. However at date 0 not all information
is available. The ex-ante optimal level of liquidity to hold at date
0 is therefore different from the ex-post optimal level of liquidity
at date 1/2 once uncertainty about the macroeconomic scenario
is resolved, but this affects banker’s incentives. To mitigate this
ex-ante incentive problem, the capital ratio must be adjusted to a
higher level, reducing total lending in the initial stage. By contrast, a
combination of capital insurance and securitization (with appropri-
ate capital charges) provides state-contingent liquidity when the
uncertainty about the shock is resolved.
To see this more precisely, assume that a bank with total liabil-
ities E0 + D0, lends L0 and hoards liquidity L˜0 at date 0 to be used
later. From date 0 bank’s balance sheet, we have:
L0 + L˜0 = E0 + D0. (14)
At date 1/2 when new lending opportunities ˇL0 arise, the banker
can grant new loans using the hoarded liquidity L˜0. Notice that this
amount cannot be made conditional upon the realization of the
shock, since there is no credible commitment not to employ it later
in state d. Since the state of the economy is yet unknown there is
a unique optimal level of liquidity to hoard at that date 0, that is
L˜0 = x˜L0. Given that the expected surplus in (9) is increasing in the
total lending size, this optimal rate is x˜ = ˇ. It follows that the size
of the loans portfolio is constant across states, i.e. Lu = Ld = (1 + ˇ)L0.
It is easy to prove that the capital ratio is greater (tighter credit con-
ditions) compared to that in Proposition 2, as stated in the following
result:
19 However, as dearly illustrated in 2008 by AIG’s incapacity to honor its CDS  com-
mitments without State support, some form of prudential regulation is needed to
guarantee that the counterparties to these contingent contracts remain solvent in
the  downturn.
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Proposition 4. Holding excess liquidity at date 0 entails a larger cap-
ital ratio (and thus a lower volume of loans) compared to the solution
in Proposition 2.
Proof. See in Appendix A. 
There are two reasons why this solution is dominated by the
solution in Proposition 2. The ﬁrst is that now it is impossible
to implement the tough incentive scheme leading to xd = 0 : the
banker is equally rewarded in the two states, but this leaves her
a greater rent and reduces the repayment promised to depositors.
As a consequence, the scale of activity of the bank is smaller. The
second is that liquidity management is improved when transfers of
funds across states occur once the realization of the shock is known.
The solution in Proposition 2 guarantees a better use of bank capi-
tal, by allocating funds to the state in which liquidity is worth more.
This is analogous to the analysis of corporate risk management
by Froot et al. (1993) as a way to improve coordination between
investment opportunities and ﬁnancing policies. Our result also
suggests that banks with access to securitization tend to hold less
capital and increase their lending compared to other banks. This
prediction ﬁnds support in Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) as they
confront the behavior of US banks: more active banks in the loan
sale market tend to hold less capital and have a larger lending size
compared to other banks. Also Goderis et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence
that banks issuing collateralized loan obligations tend to expand
their lending by 50%.
Postponed uncertainty. In the model with macro uncertainty we
have assumed that new business opportunities arise after the real-
ization of the macro shock. Let us discuss the effect of reversing the
sequence between new lending opportunities and the macro shock.
Assume that new lending opportunities arise before the realization
of the macro shock. Under this assumption the optimal lending size
must be set before the state of the economy is known, similarly to
the previous case of liquidity hoarding. However, differently from
before, the bank now can access ﬁnancial markets at date 1/2 to
obtain new funding from investors. The difference with respect to
Proposition 2 is that here uncertainty is yet unresolved when decid-
ing the optimal lending size. To see this more precisely, assume that
the bank with total liabilities E0 + D0, lends L0 at date 0. At date 1/2
new lending opportunities ˇL0 arise, and the banker must decide
a unique optimal lending size L˜ = (1 + x˜)L0 before the state of the
economy is known. Substituting L˜ into (9) the expected surplus is:
S = [R − p − 1 − q˛]˜L. (15)
Because of assumption (A3), the optimal lending size is achieved
by choosing the maximum expansion rate x˜ = ˇ. It is easy to prove
that the capital ratio is greater (tighter credit conditions) compared
to that in Proposition 2, as stated in the following result:
Proposition 5. When new lending opportunities arise before the
macro shock, the optimal capital ratio is larger (and the lending size is
smaller) compared to the solution in Proposition 2.
Proof. See in Appendix A. 
The reason why this solution is dominated by the solution in
Proposition 2 is that here the optimal lending size is chosen under
uncertainty about the macroeconomic scenario. The lending size
is now increased by  ˇ in both macro states, but with probability q
state d realizes and the bank must cover the losses on a larger lend-
ing base compared to that in Proposition 2. Notice that the capital
ratio in Proposition 4 is greater than that in Proposition 5, itself
greater than that in Proposition 2. The reason behind this ranking
is easily explained. In the case of no access to ﬁnancial markets
(liquidity hoarding) the lending base is set when uncertainty is yet
unresolved. By relaxing the restriction on the access to ﬁnancial
markets (postponed uncertainty), still the lending size is chosen
without knowing the state of the economy. Finally when access to
ﬁnancial market is allowed and the decision about the lending size
is taken knowing the state of the economy, the capital ratio reaches
its minimum level due to the efﬁcient use of contingent liquidity.
Different roles for investors and depositors.  In the model we
assume that banks are ﬁnanced by either depositors at date 0 and
investors at date 1/2. What is the difference between these two
sources of funding? We  postulate a difference in terms of risk
appetite, in that depositors are reluctant to suffer a reduction in
the face value of their deposits in the worse macroeconomic sce-
nario, contrary to other investors in ﬁnancial markets. Evidence
in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) shows that depositors are reactive to
macroeconomic shocks. Macroeconomic shocks by producing loan
losses reduce the bank’s ability to repay depositors; depositors
then react to these shocks by withdrawing their deposits whenever
they fear that the face value of deposits is affected. They conclude
calling for a regulation that includes some provision for macroe-
conomic risks. In our model this provision is supplied by investors
in ﬁnancial markets, through a form of private capital insurance.
If depositors were willing to absorb macroeconomic risk, in addi-
tion to the idiosyncratic risk due to the low monitoring effort of
the banker, then capital insurance would be redundant, although
securitization with appropriate capital charges, would still be part
of the optimal solution.
6. Conclusion
In a model where bank monitoring is important but non-
observable we  have shown how a banker can maintain incentives
to monitor with securitization by keeping a sufﬁcient equity posi-
tion in the sold loans. Furthermore a set of contingent capital ratios
should be designed with the objective of expanding lending in
upturns, while restricting the access to securitization in downturns.
Our results have implications for the design of prudential reg-
ulation. In the standard regulatory approach (e.g. Basel II) capital
ratios are derived from VaR models where the threshold of bank
solvency is set by an exogenous probability of bank default. Our
model goes further and incorporates moral hazard considerations
into prudential regulation. One of our most important results is
that the optimal capital ratio should be state-dependent, since it
must account for bankers’ incentives in the different states of the
economy. Furthermore we  show that the capital ratio should not be
designed with the unique objective of insuring loan losses in down-
turns but also with the concern for under-investment in upturns.
A natural instrument for doing this is capital insurance for banks,
an idea put forward by Flannery (2005) and Kashyap et al. (2008).
As far as we know, our model provides the ﬁrst theoretical analysis
of how these capital insurance mechanisms should be structured
in order to maintain bankers’ incentives for monitoring loans. In
the particular case where there are no lending opportunities at
the interim date, our optimal solution can be implemented by a
simple insurance, refunding the banker for the exogenous loan
losses in downturns and by a new capital requirement increased
just by the amount of the premium of this capital insurance. When
instead new investment opportunities are available, securitization
is part of the optimal regulatory scheme. In this case, we  show how
the capital requirement must be adjusted for preserving bankers’
monitoring incentives.
Our paper has adopted a micro-prudential perspective in the
sense that the analysis is conducted at the individual bank level.
Therefore, it does not consider all the interesting questions associ-
ated with contagion and systemic risk. Also it is beyond the scope
of this paper to account for dynamic regulation. However one could
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extend the dynamic contract techniques developed for instance in
Bias et al. (2007) to a model with aggregate shocks to determine
the optimal inter-temporal contract and see how it can be imple-
mented by a combination of securitization and contingent capital
or other hybrid forms of ﬁnancing. This would be an ideal set-up for
studying macro-prudential regulation of large ﬁnancial institutions
with access to securitization.
Finally we assume that the probability of being in a recession
is exogenous, although we know that bank behavior might affect
the persistence of a recession. The investment side of our model is
too simple to analyze the impact of a credit crunch on productive
investments and hence on the business cycle. We  leave for future
research the task of extending our analysis to capture the dynamics
of the business cycle together with optimal capital regulation.
Acknowledgements
We  appreciated comments from participants on a previous ver-
sion circulated under the title “Solvency regulation and credit risk
transfer” in the following conferences: Second Conference on Bank-
ing Regulation, ZEW, Mannheim (October 2007), Conference on
Interaction of Market and Credit Risk, Berlin (December 2007),
Unicredit Group and CSEF Conference on Banking and Finance,
Naples (December 2007), Conference on the Transmission of Credit
Risk and Bank Stability, Cass Business School, London (May 2008),
Conference on Risk Transfer Mechanisms and Financial Stability,
Basel (May 2008), Finlawmetrics Conference, Bocconi University,
Milan (June 2008), European Economic Association, Milan (August
2008), Conference on Financial Intermediaries and the Markets
at the Cross Roads, Amsterdam (September 2008), and in sem-
inars at the Finance Department (Frankfurt University), Catholic
University (Milan), at the IFF (University of St.Gallen) at the VU
University (Amsterdam). Special thanks are due to Janet Mitchell
and Alan Morrison. We  acknowledge also helpful suggestions from
two anonymous referees and Thorsten Beck (Guest Editor). All
remaining errors are our own responsibility. Cerasi acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from PRIN2005 and FAR2006. Rochet acknowl-
edges ﬁnancial support from the European Research Council
under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007-2013) grant agreement 249415-RMAC and from NCCR
FinRisk (Project on Banking and Regulation).
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the deﬁnition of kS from the bench-
mark model, the expected social surplus in (9) can be re-written
as
S = (1 − q)
[
(1 − p) B
p
− kS
]
Lu + q
[
(1 − p) B
p
− (kS + ˛)
]
Ld,
(16)
with Lu ≡ (1 + xu)L0 and Ld ≡ (1 + xd)L0. The optimal solution requires
choosing the level of loans L0, deposits D0 and a rate of growth of
loans in both states 0 ≤ xd, xu ≤ ˇ, that maximize expected social
surplus in (16) under the incentive compatibility constraints (6),
depositors and investors participation conditions (7) and (8).
The expected surplus (16) is increasing in both Lu and Ld (this
is because assumption (A3) implies that the NPV of loans is pos-
itive, even in state d), therefore the two incentive compatibility
constraints (6) are binding.
Once we substitute D0 = L0 − E0 into (7) and solve for the
expected face value of deposits D1, we have
(1 − p)D1 ≥ L0 − E0 − (1 − q)p(R − )Lu − qp(R −  ˛ − )Ld. (17)
Further, if we substitute the binding incentive compatibility condi-
tions (6) into (8) and solve for the expected face value of deposits
we obtain
(1 − p)D1 ≤ (1 − q)(1 − p)
(
R − B
p
)
Lu + q(1 − p)
×
(
R −  ˛ − B
p
)
Ld − (1 − q)xuL0 − qxdL0. (18)
Combining (17) and (18) after substituting xsL0 = Ls − L0 (with s = u,
d) we obtain:
E0 ≥ (1 − q)
[
1 − R + B
p
+ p
(
 − B
p
)]
Lu
+ q
[
1 − R + B
p
+ p
(
 − B
p
)
+ ˛
]
Ld,
which can be simpliﬁed into:
E0 ≥ (1 − q)kSLu + q(kS + ˛)Ld. (19)
Given that the expected surplus is increasing in both Lu and Ld,
condition (19) must be binding. We are thus left with maximizing
S, given by (16) under the unique constraint (19). The two  vari-
ables are Lu = (1 + xu)L0 and Ld = (1 + xd)L0. This is a linear program.
It is immediate to see that the solution implies choosing xu =  ˇ and
xd = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The maximum pledgeable income to
depositors at date 1 when the banker is solvent in state u is
Du1 =
(
R − B
p
)
(1 +  ˇ − y)L0 − Tu,
while in state d it is
Dd1 =
(
R −  ˛ − B
p
)
L0 − Td.
The depositors’ participation condition is
(1 − q)
{
(1 − p)Du1 + p(1 +  ˇ − y)(R − )L0 − pTu
}
+ q
{
(1 − p)Dd1 + p(R −  ˛ − )L0 − pTd
}
≥ D0.
Substituting Du1 and D
d
1 from the deﬁnitions of maximum pledge-
able income, we derive
(1 − q)[(1 +  ˇ − y)(1 − kS)L0 − Tu] + q[(1 − kS)L0 − ˛L0 − Td] ≥ D0.
Using the condition that the expected transfers across states must
be zero, namely (1 − q)Tu + qTd = 0, and substituting date 0 bank’s
balance sheet in (3), gives
E0
L0
≥ kS + (1 − q)(1 − kS)ykS + q  ˛ = kS + (1 − q)ˇkS + q˛.
that is the capital ratio in Proposition 2.
Finally, to compute the optimal amount of transfers to investors
we assume that the face value promised to depositors must be con-
stant across states, that is Du1 = Dd1 = D1. Taking the difference of the
two pledgeable incomes, gives
Tu − Td =
[
 ˛ − y
(
R − B
p
)
kS
]
L0 = WL0.
From the condition (1 − q)Tu + qTd = 0, it follows that Tu = qW and
Td = − (1 − q)W. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Since uncertainty is yet unresolved at
t = 0, excess liquidity L˜0 = x˜L0 cannot be made state contingent:
there is a unique level of liquidity x˜ = xu = xd. Given that the
expected surplus in (9) is increasing in this level of liquidity, the
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optimal rate is x˜ =  ˇ and thus the size of the loans portfolio at date
1 is L˜ = (1 + ˇ)L0. Depositors’ participation condition is
(1 − p)D1 + p(R − )˜L − qp˛L˜ ≥ D0. (20)
Given the uniform size of the loans portfolio at date 1, the minimum
bonus for the banker to monitor is:
bu > bd ≥ B
p
L˜.
This sets an upper limit to the repayment promised to depositors,
which corresponds to state d maximum pledgeable income:
D1 =
(
R −  ˛ − B
p
)
L˜. (21)
Substituting (21) into (20) together with date 0 balance sheet in
(14), delivers the minimum capital requirement:
E0 ≥ k˜0L0,
where k˜0 = (1 + ˇ)[kS + ˛(1 − p) + pq˛]. It is easy to check that
k˜0 > k0. The result is easily proven since both k˜0 and k0 are linear
functions of q. At the two extremes, q = 0 and q = 1, it is k˜0 > k0. Thus
following from the linearity of the two functions, k˜0(q) > k0(q) for
all q ∈ (0, 1). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Since uncertainty is yet unresolved at
t = 0, the lending size L˜ =
(
1 + x˜
)
L0 cannot differ across macroeco-
nomic states. Given that the expected surplus in (15) is increasing in
the lending size, the optimal growth rate is x˜ =  ˇ and thus the size
of the loans portfolio at date 1 is L˜ = (1 + ˇ)L0. Depositors’ partici-
pation condition is given also in this case by (20) and the minimum
bonus for the banker to monitor is B/p˜L, similarly to the liquid-
ity hoarding case. New business opportunities are funded through
ﬁnancial markets at date 1/2. Investors’ participation constraint at
date 1/2 can be derived substituting the constant lending size L˜
and the minimum bonus for the banker into (8).  We  obtain the
following system of equations:
(1 − p)D1 ≥ (L0 − E0) + qp˛L˜ − p(R − )˜L
(1 − p)D1 ≤ (1 − p)
(
R − B
p
)
L˜ − q(1 − p)˛L˜ − (˜L − L0)
For the two disequalities to hold at the same time the RHS of the
second one must be greater or equal than the RHS of the ﬁrst one.
Finally substituting date 0 balance sheet from (3),  delivers the min-
imum capital requirement:
E0 ≥ (1 + ˇ)(kS + q˛)L0.
It is immediate to prove that this capital ratio is greater than the
capital ratio in Proposition 2, implying a smaller lending size. 
Appendix B. Benchmark model with continuous loan losses
Our simple benchmark model is extremely stylized. We  show
here that the logic of our model is preserved when we  assume loan
losses with a continuous probability distribution, using a speciﬁ-
cation closer to the credit risk literature.20 Suppose that each loan
returns either R or (R − ˜) with loan losses ˜ randomly distributed
according to a cumulative density function F (˜) in the interval [0,
R]. The monitoring effort of the banker e can take either of the two
values e = {0, 1} with 1 being the higher effort. A loans portfolio
of size L0 returns (R − ˜)L0. Given that returns are observable the
20 See Pagès (2009) for similar results.
reward scheme for the banker is a function of loan losses ˜, that is
b(˜)L0.
We  assume further that the effort impacts only on the proba-
bility of default, but not on the amount of the loss given default,
namely that the c.d.f. is separable in effort and loan losses, i.e.
Fe (˜) = [1 − p(e)] + p(e)F (˜)
Given that the effort can take only two  values we  deﬁne p the
minimum probability of losses given a higher effort while p + p
the probability of losses in case the banker does not exert effort
and thus we have that F1(˜) − F0(˜) = p[1 − F (˜)]. By adapting
the arguments of Innes (1990),  it can be shown that the optimal
contract21 is similar to that in the benchmark model.
Denote by b(˜) the remuneration per unit of loan of the banker
when the level of losses is a random variable ˜ taking values on the
interval [0, R]. The optimal contract is obtained by minimizing the
expected remuneration of the banker (conditional on effort) under
the incentive compatibility constraint:∫ R
0
b(˜)[F1(˜) − F0(˜)]d˜ ≥ B,
and the constraints that ˜ → b(˜) and ˜ → ˜ + b(˜) are both
decreasing. Denoting by b˙(˜) the derivative of b, these constraints
boil down to:
−1 ≤ b˙(˜) ≤ 0. (22)
Moreover, limited liability requires that
0 ≤ b(˜) ≤ R − ˜ for all ˜.
This is consequence of (22) whenever:
b(R) = 0.
After integration by parts the problem becomes equivalent to⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
∫ R
0
−b˙(˜)F1(˜)d˜∫ R
0
b˙(˜)[F0(˜) − F1(˜)]d˜ ≥ B
0 ≤ b˙ ≤ 1.
Denoting by  the multiplier associated with the incentive com-
patibility constraint, the problem consists in ﬁnding b˙(˜) that
minimizes −b˙(˜)[F1(˜) + (F0(˜) − F1(˜))] over [− 1, 0]. The solution
is bang-bang:
b˙(˜) = −1I{F1(˜)+(F0(˜)−F1(˜))<0}.
As a consequence of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, the
set of losses ˜ for which the function F1(˜) + (F0(˜) − F1(˜)) is neg-
ative is an interval [0,  ∗]. Therefore the optimal contract is:
b(˜) = L0[∗ − ˜]+.
To summarize:
21 Like Innes (1990), we restrict attention to contracts such that the marginal remu-
neration of the banker (as a function of loans’ returns) is always between 0 and
1.
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• The banker is rewarded b(˜) = (∗ − ˜)L0 whenever losses ˜ do
not exceed the threshold ∗ and 0 if losses are above this thresh-
old. Thus ∗ can be interpreted as the bank’s default threshold.
• The bank’s default threshold ∗ is determined by the incentive
compatibility condition:
∫ ∗
0
[F1(˜) − F0(˜)]d˜ = B,
which in our special case becomes:
∫ ∗
0
[1 − F (˜)]d˜ = B
p
.
The default threshold ∗ is the minimum value that provides
the banker who exerts a monitoring effort (distribution of losses
F1(˜)) with an incremental expected gain (with respect to the
case where she shirks, and the distribution of losses is F0(˜)) at
least equal to the beneﬁt B from shirking.
• The minimum capital ratio must be set equal to the net expected
shortfalls
E0
L0
≥
∫
max(˜, ∗)dF1(˜) − (R − 1).
There are two fundamental differences with the VaR approach
to prudential regulation. First, the capital requirement is meant
to cover not the Value at Risk, but the net expected shortfalls.
This means that it covers the expected losses above the default
threshold ∗, net of the nominal excess return (R − 1) on loans. The
second difference is that the default threshold ∗ is not given by an
exogenously determined probability of default but by the incen-
tive compatibility condition. This example shows that also a more
realistic model of default risk bears the same implications for the
optimal capital requirement of our simple model in Section 3.1.
References
Acharya, V., Schnabl, P., Suarez, G. 2012. Securitization without risk transfer. Jour-
nal  of Financial Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2012.09.004, in
press.
Allen, F., Carletti, E., 2006. Credit risk transfer and contagion. Journal of Monetary
Economics 53, 89–111.
Arping, S., 2004. Credit Protection and Lending Relationships. EFA 2004 Maastricht
Meetings Paper No. 4551.
Benmelech, E., Dlugosz, J., 2009. The credit rating crisis. In: NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, pp. 161–207.
Bias, B., Mariotti, T., Plantin, G., Rochet, J.C., 2007. Dynamic security design: conver-
gence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. Review of Economic
Studies 74 (2), 345–390.
BIS – Bank for International Settlements, 2008. Credit Risk Transfer. The Joint Forum.
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint21.htm
Cebenoyan, S., Strahan, P.E., 2004. Risk management, capital structure and lending
at  banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 19–43.
Cerasi, V., Daltung, S., 2000. The optimal size of a bank: costs and beneﬁts of diver-
siﬁcation. European Economic Review 44, 1701–1726.
Chiesa, G., 2008. Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored ﬁnance, and banks. Journal
of  Financial Intermediation 17 (4), 464–477.
Dewatripont, M.,  Tirole, J., 1999. The Prudential Regulation of Banks. MIT Press,
Cambridge, USA.
Diamond, D., 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of
Economic Studies 51, 393–414.
Duffee, G., Zhou, C., 2001. Credit derivatives in banking: useful tools for managing
risk? Journal of Monetary Economics 48, 25–54.
Dufﬁe, D., 2008. Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Sta-
bility. BIS Working Paper No. 255.
ECB – European Central Bank, 2004. Credit Risk Trans-
fer  by EU Banks: Activities, Risks and Risk Management.
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditrisktransfer200405en.pdf
Fender, I., Mitchell, J., 2009. Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: A
Screening Model. BIS Working Paper No. 289.
Flannery, M.J., 2005. No pain, no gain? Effecting market discipline with reverse con-
vertible debentures. In: Scott, Hal S. (Ed.), Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel. Oxford
University Press, Oxford (Chapter 5).
Flannery, M.J., 2009. Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital
Certiﬁcates. Unpublished manuscript, University of Florida.
Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D., Stein, J., 1993. Risk management: coordinating corporate
investment and ﬁnancing policies. Journal of Finance 48, 1629–1658.
Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2012. Neglected risks, ﬁnancial innovation, and
ﬁnancial fragility. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 452–468.
Goderis, B., Marsh, I.W., Castello, J., Wagner, W.,  2006. Bank Behavior with Access to
Credit Risk Transfer Markets. CentER Discussion Paper No. 100. Tilburg Univer-
sity.
Gorton, G., Pennacchi, G., 1995. Banks and loan sales. Marketing nonmarketable
assets. Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389–411.
Hellwig, M.,  2009. Systemic risk in the ﬁnancial sector: an analysis of the subprime-
mortgage ﬁnancial crisis. De Economist 157 (2), 129–207.
Holmström, B., Tirole, J., 1997. Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real
sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691.
Innes, R., 1990. Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action
choices. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45–67.
Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C., 2004. Cyclical implications of the Basel-II capital standards.
Economic Perspectives, Federal Bank of Chicago 28 (1) (1st Quarter).
Kashyap, A.K., Rajan, R., Stein, J.C., 2008. Rethinking Capital Regulation. Paper pre-
sented in the Kansas City Fed Conference, Jackson Hole, August 2008.
Keys, B.J., Mukherjee, T.K., Seru, A., Vig, V., 2010. Did securitization lead to lax screen-
ing?  Evidence from subprime loans. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (1),
307–362.
Kiff,  J., Michaud, F.L., Mitchell, J., 2003. An analytical review of credit risk transfer
instruments. Banque de France Financial Stability Review (June), 106–131.
Levy-Yeyati, E., Martinez Peria, M.S., Schmukler, S.L., 2010. Depositor behavior under
macroeconomic risk: evidence from bank runs in emerging economies. Journal
of  Money, Credit and Banking 42 (4), 585–614.
Minton, B.A., Stulz, R.M., Williamson, R.G., 2009. How much do banks use credit
derivatives to hedge loans? Journal of Financial Services Research 35 (1), 1–31.
Mora, N., 2010. Lender Exposure and Effort in the Syndicated Loan Market, RWP
10-12. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Morrison, A.D., 2005. Credit derivatives, disintermediation and investment deci-
sions. Journal of Business 78 (2), 621–647.
Nicolò, A., Pelizzon, L., 2008. Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque
OTC markets. Journal of Financial Intermediation 17 (4), 444–463.
Ongena, S., Tümer-Alkan, G., Westernhagen, N., 2012. Creditor concentration: an
empirical investigation. European Economic Review 56 (4), 830–847.
Pagès, H., 2009. Bank Incentives and Optimal CDOs. Discussion Paper No. 253.
Banque de France, Paris, France.
Parlour, C.A., Plantin, G., 2008. Loan sales and relationship banking. Journal of
Finance 63 (3), 1291–1314.
Parlour, C.A., Winton, A. Laying-off credit risk: loan sales versus credit default swaps.
Journal of Financial Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2012.08.004,
forthcoming.
Plantin, G., 2010. Good Securitization, Bad Securitization. Unpublished manuscript,
Toulouse School of Economics, France.
Rochet, J.C., 2004. Macroeconomic shocks and banking supervision. Journal of Finan-
cial Stability 1, 93–110.
Thompson, J.R., 2006. Credit Risk Transfer: To Sell or to Insure. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Economics, Queen’s University.
Wagner, W.,  Marsh, I.W., 2006. Credit risk transfer and ﬁnancial sector. Journal of
Financial Stability 2, 173–193.
Wagner, W.,  2007. The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability. Journal of
Banking and Finance 31 (1), 121–139.
